FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
APR 19 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DARRIL HEDRICK; et al., No. 14-15866
Plaintiffs - Appellees, D.C. No. 2:76-cv-00162-GEB-
EFB
v.
JAMES GRANT, as Sheriff of Yuba MEMORANDUM*
County; et al.,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Garland E. Burrell, Jr., Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 11, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge and REINHARDT and CHRISTEN, Circuit
Judges.
Defendants moved under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 18
U.S.C. § 3626(b), to terminate a consent decree concerning the conditions of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
confinement at the Yuba County jail. The district court held that Defendants did
not meet their burden and denied the motion. We affirm.
1. The purpose of the PLRA is “to expedite prison litigation and place
control over prisons back into the hands of state and local officials.” Plata v.
Brown, 754 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, “[w]hen a party moves
to terminate prospective relief under § 3626(b), the burden is on the movant to
demonstrate that there are no ongoing constitutional violations, that the relief
ordered exceeds what is necessary to correct an ongoing constitutional violation, or
both.” Graves v. Arpaio,
623 F.3d 1043 , 1048 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing
Gilmore v. California,
220 F.3d 987 , 1007-08 (9th Cir.2000).1 Defendants did not
meet this burden. Instead, they simply urged that they were entitled to termination
as a matter of law, and presented almost no evidence about ongoing violations2 or
that the Decree was overly broad.
1
Defendants cite Mayweathers v. Newland to suggest that Plaintiffs have the
burden under § 3626(b). See 258 F.3d 930 , 936 (9th Cir. 2001). Mayweathers,
however, involved the automatic expiration of a preliminary injunction under
§ 3626(a)(2) and its discussion of § 3626(b) may be properly read simply as stating
that the PLRA forces courts to frequently revisit prospective relief to ensure that it
is no broader than necessary. We are bound by Graves’ and Gilmore’s direct
holding.
2
Defendants cited the judicially noticeable fact that there had been no
docket activity in the case over a long period, but this is not sufficient in itself to
show that there are no ongoing constitutional violations.
2
We reject Defendants’ arguments that they were nonetheless entitled to
termination under § 3626(b)(1) and (b)(2). Although Defendants are correct that
(b)(1) allowed them to move for termination because enough time had passed, they
are wrong that termination should have followed automatically. Rather Defendants
still were required to meet the burden described above. See Plata, 754 F.3d at
1076-77;
Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 1007-08 .
Subsection (b)(2) provides for immediate termination of relief which “was
approved or granted in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is
narrowly [tailored]” to correct the violation of a federal right. Defendants argue
that the Decree is flawed because the court neither found any constitutional
violation, nor stated that the remedy was narrowly tailored. This is incorrect.
First, at a minimum, the Decree incorporates the court’s earlier constitutional
findings by citing the decision which concluded that Defendants had violated
Plaintiffs’ Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Second,
although the Decree lacks an explicit finding that the remedy is narrowly tailored,
such a statement is not required under (b)(2). See Gilmore, 220 F.3d at 1007 n.25.
Instead, Defendants must show that “the remedy exceeded the constitutional
3
minimum according to the record and the relevant caselaw.” Id. at 1008.
Defendants did not do so.3 The court did not err by not terminating the decree.
2. Defendants also argue that the district court erred procedurally either by
failing to make required findings, or by not holding an evidentiary hearing. We
need not determine whether, in the absence of Defendants meeting their burden
under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2), subsection (b)(3) requires the court to make
written findings that the Decree is necessary to correct ongoing violations of
federal rights and is narrowly tailored. The court’s finding that Defendants did not
meet any part of their burden is equivalent to stating that, as a matter of law, the
Decree is necessary and narrowly tailored.
Regarding an evidentiary hearing, the district court instructed that “if a party
opines that an evidentiary hearing should be ordered, that party [should] state that
in the [joint statement] with the type of factual showing that would justify a
focused evidentiary hearing.” The Defendants did not request such a hearing,
3
Defendants also argue that termination is appropriate under general
equitable principles, citing Rule 60(b) cases. We note that Defendants did not
move under Rule 60(b). Even if they had, they did not meet their burden to put
forward evidence that “compliance with the decree [had become] substantially
more onerous” or the “decree [had] prove[n] to be unworkable because of
unforeseen obstacles.” See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 , 384
(1992). The age of the decree and absence of court action in the case are certainly
relevant, but are not enough, particularly in light of Plaintiffs’ evidence of
violations of the decree.
4
reiterating their argument that they were entitled to termination as a matter of law,
and presented no factual showing at all. Having ignored the court’s instructions,
Defendants cannot show it was an abuse of discretion to fail to hold an evidentiary
hearing.
AFFIRMED
5